Artificial Independence: Board Independence in Internal Investigations
On Sunday, Nov. 8, Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang sent his employees a short message. “I was unfaithful to my wife,” he wrote. “There is no excuse for what I did.” According to press reporting, Mr. Huang was referring to Alice Huang, a former executive of Megaspeed, a Singapore data center company that bought billions of dollars of equipment containing Nvidia chips.
The press further reports that the U.S. government believes that Ms. Huang was an asset of the Chinese government’s intelligence apparatus and that she targeted Mr. Huang in an effort to, among other things, impact U.S. policy with respect to the export of such chips to China.
The public revelation of Mr. Huang’s apparent relationship with Ms. Huang led—unsurprisingly—to a firestorm. The Justice Department reportedly has three investigations underway: an antitrust inquiry focused on Nvidia and inquiries into Megaspeed and Super Micro that focus on Ms. Huang’s role. A securities class action followed on Nov. 9, and House committee chairs have asked Mr. Huang for a closed-door briefing.
The Nvidia board moved swiftly, announcing that it had commissioned an internal investigation into Mr. Huang’s alleged conduct. According to the media, the company retained Joon H. Kim, the widely respected former Acting U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and his firm, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to conduct the internal investigation.
On Nov. 11, Mr. Huang resigned as CEO and as a director, and the board named Chief Financial Officer Colette Kress interim CEO.
The board’s decision to conduct an internal investigation and retain Mr. Kim to lead it signals the seriousness with which the company is taking the issue. And undoubtedly the confluence of alleged marital infidelity with U.S. national security interests will present novel questions for the internal investigators and U.S. regulators alike.
But at the same time, these circumstances also highlight an age-old question for companies all the way from the size of Nvidia to the smallest start-up: when senior leadership itself is alleged to be responsible for the misconduct, how can the investigation be overseen to ensure that it is sufficiently independent to be credible to the various audiences, be it shareholders or U.S. authorities?
In this article, we consider these questions and some of the prior guidance that boards and their counsel can consult to bolster the independence—and thus credibility—of the internal investigation.
A Seat at the (Committee) Table
At its core, the question of the independence of an internal investigation turns on a number of factors. For example, in assessing the independence of an investigation, regulators are likely to look to whether any limitations were placed on counsel’s inquiry, or whether they were given full access to whatever information they deemed relevant. But the question of independence starts at a much earlier and foundational point—namely, who at the company is responsible for making decisions and overseeing the investigation in the first place.
The logic for this inquiry is obvious: a decisionmaker who is concerned about what the investigation may reveal about their own potential misconduct could be well-incentivized to curtail the investigation to prevent discovery of that same misconduct.
Moreover, because investigating counsel, prosecutors, and other regulators may not have well-formed views initially about who at the company was involved in the alleged misconduct, it can be difficult for outside counsel to make those assessments with certainty at the outset of the investigation, when key decisions are being made.
As defense counsel are all too aware, DOJ can often be (frustratingly) unwilling to share much information about its view of any one particular employee or executive. Nor does the DOJ provide much public guidance that would enable company or outside counsel to predict DOJ’s perception of an investigation’s independence.
DOJ’s public pronouncements ask what steps a company takes “to ensure investigations are independent, objective, appropriately conducted, and properly documented.” U.S. Dept. of Justice, Criminal Division, Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs 7–8 (updated Sept. 2024).
And to earn cooperation credit, a company must identify “all individuals involved in or responsible for the misconduct at issue, regardless of their position, status or seniority,” language broad enough to reach directors. Justice Manual 9-28.700.
Thus, while these public statements make clear that DOJ prioritizes independence in an investigation, they do little to inform the public about how DOJ assesses that independence.
The SEC offers slightly more insight into its thinking. In particular, the SEC laid out certain factors in the 2001 “Seaboard Report,” in which the Commission declined to charge a company whose board had hired outside counsel to investigate a controller’s misconduct and shared the results with the staff. Exchange Act Release No. 44969 (Oct. 23, 2001). The SEC’s Enforcement Manual, revised in February, still relies on it.
Among other things, the Seaboard Report asks: “Did management, the Board or committees consisting solely of outside directors oversee the review? Did company employees or outside persons perform the review? If outside persons, had they done other work for the company? Where the review was conducted by outside counsel, had management previously engaged such counsel? Were scope limitations placed on the review?” These questions should thus be at the forefront of outside counsel and the company’s thinking when deciding how to structure the decision-making hierarchy governing an internal investigation.
What Outside Counsel Can and Cannot Fix
As the Seaboard Report and countless internal investigations demonstrate, the safest way for a company to ensure the impartiality of an investigation is to retain outside counsel to run it, as Nvidia apparently has. But that remedy only goes so far, because, as everyone knows, a lawyer has a client to answer to. Thus, the question remains—even if a company retains outside counsel to conduct an internal investigation, who does that counsel take instruction from at the company?
Where senior management is clearly not involved in the alleged misconduct, those executives will often oversee outside counsel’s work and make critical decisions about it, including whether to voluntarily disclose any misconduct to authorities, waive privilege as part of regulatory engagement, or terminate key employees.
But where it is senior management’s conduct that is under the microscope, having them make these decisions is unlikely to be viewed favorably by U.S. regulators or shareholders eager for an understanding of what actually happened at the company.
In those cases, the responsibility may well be best vested in the board and its directors. But that, too, is not a panacea in every case, because the directors’ own conduct may come under scrutiny as part of the investigation in multiple ways.
First, even if a director did not themselves engage in knowing misconduct, they may still be an important witness in the internal investigation. For example, in cases where there are allegations of securities fraud, a director may have sat through management briefings containing purportedly false information or authorized public statements about it.
Even though that director may have been unwitting with respect to the falsity of the information, they still would likely be someone that outside counsel—or even regulators—may want to interview as part of their fact-finding mandate. But because the director may, understandably, want to avoid entanglement in the alleged misconduct, there may be a perceived conflict of interest if that director has the ability to curtail outside counsel’s investigation into the director’s involvement.
Second, and relatedly, directors may feel vulnerable to legal exposure based on their obligations to supervise senior management. Since Caremark, directors have been responsible for a good-faith effort to oversee the company’s compliance with law. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). If the internal investigation finds that compliance failed, or that the board failed to properly identify and address it, then that could implicate the board as well. And that implication could undermine the independence of the board’s investigation, at least in the public or regulators’ minds.
These risks were underscored by an investigation conducted by Hewlett Packard more than 20 years ago. Specifically, in 2005 and 2006, HP’s board tried to find out which director was leaking boardroom discussions to the press. Its regular outside counsel interviewed directors without identifying the source.
The chair, who had attended the meetings whose discussions were leaked, pursued the effort through internal personnel and outside investigators. An in-house ethics lawyer directed the renewed inquiry. During the leak investigations, contractors obtained the phone records of directors, employees, and journalists by impersonating them to their phone carriers. When the methods became public, the general counsel, the ethics lawyer, and several investigators invoked the Fifth Amendment before a House subcommittee. California charged the chair and four others with felonies. The state charges were eventually dismissed.
Separate federal cases produced guilty pleas from three participants, including an investigator who received a three-month prison sentence. HP paid $14.5 million to settle the state’s civil claims. Put bluntly, in that case, the board’s investigation into potential misconduct was itself the cause of potential criminal and civil liability for the board.
Counsel still answers to a client. A board committee has only the authority the board gives it. 8 Del. C. §141(c). The committee approves the scope of the internal investigation, receives the findings, and decides whether to waive privilege and what to tell the government. Those are the decisions the SEC and the Justice Department care about most, which is why Seaboard asks separately who oversaw the review and who performed it.
Scope is where Nvidia’s problem is sharpest. If the internal investigation is to ask whether the board adequately oversaw Mr. Huang and the company’s export compliance, the committee members are deciding whether, and how closely, to review themselves.
Delaware’s rules for special litigation committees do not govern Nvidia’s internal investigation, but they show how courts think about the problem. When a board forms one of these committees to decide whether the company should sue its own directors, the committee must prove “independence, good faith and a reasonable investigation.” Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981).
In In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation, the Court of Chancery rejected a committee of two Stanford professors without material financial ties to the defendants, because ties between Stanford and the directors under investigation raised “a reasonable doubt about the impartiality of the SLC.” 824 A.2d 917, 920–21 (Del. Ch. 2003). Delaware does not disqualify a director solely for board service or approval of the challenged transaction. Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d 1184, 1189 (Del. 1985), aff’g 484 A.2d 501 (Del. Ch. 1984).
These cases require a fact-specific inquiry into impartiality. For Nvidia, the practical concern is that a director who helped approve a statement would be evaluating the adequacy of that director’s own judgment. Choosing directors outside that process would strengthen confidence in the findings.
Nvidia’s committee is not a litigation committee, at least not yet. But with a securities class action pending, derivative claims are likely, and the choices the committee makes now may end up in a Zapata record.
So What to Do?
To be clear, in many internal investigations, the answers to these questions will be straightforward: the general counsel’s office will oversee outside counsel’s work and help report those findings to senior management or the board for decision-making. Where, however, there is concern about whether the outside world will question whether the board is adequately distanced from the alleged misconduct to oversee the investigation, then the company should consider taking certain steps, including:
Consider Appointing a Special Committee of the Board. One option for the board is to appoint a special committee that is responsible for managing the internal investigation, including with respect to making crucial decisions about reporting to authorities the results of that investigation. In doing so, however, the board should consider two issues. First, because a board committee has only the authority the board gives it, the board should ensure that it has delegated sufficient authority to the committee to allow it to do a thorough investigation and to ensure that the public believes that. Second, the independence of the members of the committee is a critical factor in its eventual success. As Oracle shows, that determination goes beyond simply whether a committee member has a financial stake in the investigation. Thus, in determining the membership of the committee, it is important that the board consider all angles by which the committee’s independence could be attacked.
Inventory the Witnesses and Subjects, Then Staff the Committee Without Them. Before naming the committee, identify which directors were told relevant facts as they unfolded, and which approved or signed the relevant statements. Choose members from the directors left over and add a new independent director if none remain. A member who is also a witness has to be interviewed by the committee’s own counsel, which means counsel is interviewing one of the people directing its work.
Protect Witnesses’ Independent Recollections. Reviewing records to refresh recollection is routine. Giving a director other witnesses’ accounts or draft findings before an interview can create questions about whether the director’s account reflects independent recollection. Committee counsel should control access to those materials.
Take the Internal Investigation Out of the Legal Department When the Legal Department Is In the Fact Pattern. No officer whose conduct the committee will examine should help choose counsel, and that includes the general counsel when the legal department is involved in the underlying facts. Committee counsel should report only to the committee, every contact with the government about the inquiry should run through committee counsel, and any officer who is a witness should have separate counsel.
Reassure the Market By Describing the Process and Save Conclusions for the End. A board facing a scandal has good reason to project stability. It can do that by describing the internal investigation: who sits on the committee, who is counsel, and what the inquiry covers. It should not announce conclusions before the work begins, because those statements may serve to undercut the board’s independence in the view of relevant stakeholders. For example, if the board makes early public statements that it has not “seen any evidence of” or is “not aware of any evidence of” misconduct that turn out to be incorrect, those may well be spun by creative plaintiffs’ counsel or regulators as attempts by the board to inappropriately deflect or conceal alleged misconduct.
Conclusion
There is unfortunately no way around it—internal investigations can be messy and can be messier even still when the subject of the investigation is alleged misconduct by senior management. But the company’s headaches will only be worse if, after expending enormous effort and expense, the results of that internal investigation are met with skepticism because of doubts about the decisionmakers’ impartiality.
Retaining experienced and respected outside counsel to guide the investigation is a first and important step. But the company should also then work with that counsel to ensure that the internal supervision of that internal investigation conveys an aura of independence that the public and regulators can count on.
Failure to do so may well cause those stakeholders to view the investigation as a product of AI—artificial independence, that is—and thus discredit it.
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This article first appeared in the November 19, 2026, edition of the “New York Law Journal” © 2026 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or reprints@alm.com.